Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

**Interim Investigative Guidelines**

# Effective October XX, 2022

Table of Contents

1. [Disease Reporting](#_1._DISEASE_REPORTING)
   1. [Purpose of Reporting Surveillance](#_Purpose_of_Reporting)
   2. [Laboratory and Physician Reporting Requirements](#_Laboratory_and_Physician)
   3. [Local Public Health Authority Responsibilities](#_Local_Public_Health)
   4. [State Public Health Division Responsibilities](#_State_Public_Health)
2. [The Disease and Its Epidemiology](#_THE_DISEASE_AND)

2.1 [Etiologic Agent](#_Etiologic_Agent)

2.2 [Description of Illness](#_Description_of_Illness)

2.3 [Reservoirs](#_Reservoirs)

2.4 [Sources and Routes of Transmission](#_Sources_and_Routes)

2.5 [Incubation Period](#_Incubation_Period)

2.6 [Period of Communicability](#_Period_of_Communicability)

2.7 [Treatment, Prevention, and Limitation of Spread](#_Treatment,_Prevention,_and)

3. [Case and Clinical Definitions](#_3.0_CASE_AND)

3.1 [Close Contact](#_3.1_Close_Contact)

3.2 [Suspect Case](#_3.2_Suspect_Case)

3.3 [Confirmed Case](#_3.3_Confirmed_Case)

3.4 [Presumptive Case](#_3.4_Presumptive_Case)

3.5 [Vaccine Breakthrough Case](#_3.5_Vaccine_Breakthrough)

3.6 [Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Children (MIS-C)](#_3.6_Multisystem_Inflammatory)

3.7 [Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Adults (MIS-A)](#_3.7_Multisystem_Inflammatory)

4. [Laboratory Testing](#_4.0_LABORATORY_TESTING)

4.1 [Testing at Commercial Laboratories](#_4.1_Testing_at)

4.2 [Testing at the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory](#_4.2_Testing_at)

4.3 [Collecting Specimens](#_4.3_Collecting_Specimens)

4.4 [Guidance Regarding Serologic Tests](#_4.4_Guidance_Regarding)

4.5 [Guidance Regarding At-Home Test Kits and Point-of-Care Tests](#_4.5_Guidance_Regarding)

5. [Quarantine and Isolation](#_5.0_Quarantine_and)

5.1 [Quarantine](#_5.1__)

5.2 [Isolation](#_5.2__)

5.3 [Isolation and Quarantine for Groups and Settings Not Included in the General Population](#_5.3_Isolation_and)

6. [LPHA Case Management](#_6.0_LPHA_Case)

6.1 [Suspect Cases](#_6.1_Suspect_Cases)

6.2 [Confirmed and Presumptive Cases](#_6.2__Confirmed)

7. [Outbreak Response](#_7.0_OUTBREAK_RESPONSE)

7.1 [Opening Outbreaks](#_7.1_Opening_Outbreaks)

7.2 [Outbreak Prioritization](#_7.2_Outbreak_Prioritization)

8. [Managing Special Situations](#_8.0._MANAGING_SPECIAL)

8.1 [Healthcare Settings](#_8.1_Healthcare_settings)

8.2 [Long-term Care Facility Settings (SNF, ALF, MC, RCF)](#_8.2_Long_term)

8.3 [Other Congregate Settings (Including, but not limited to homeless shelters, group homes, transitional housing, cruise ships)](#_8.3_Other_congregate)

8.4 [Food Chain or Agricultural Settings](#_8.4_Food_chain)

8.5 [Carceral Settings (Prisons, jails, youth detention facilities)](#_8.5_Carceral_settings)

8.6 [K-12 School Settings](#_8.6_K–12_school)

8.7 [Childcare Settings](#_8.7_Childcare_Settings)

8.8 [Notifications from CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine and other Federal and State Partners](#_8.8_Notifications_from)

8.9 [Pregnant Persons](#_8.8_Pregnant_Persons)

9. [Data Management](#_9.0_DATA_MANAGEMENT)

9.1 [Data Access and Processing](#_9.1_Data_access)

9.2 [REDCap Platform](#_9.2_REDCap_platform)

9.3 [Cases Who Fly or Travel Across State Lines](#_9.3_Cases_who)

9.4 [Managing Close Contacts](#_9.4_Managing_Close)

9.5 [MIS-C Case Management in Opera](#_9.5_MIS-C_Case)

9.6 [Outbreak Data Management](#_9.6_Outbreak_Data)

9.7 [OHA Reporting to CDC](#_9.7_OHA_Reporting)

10. [Glossary of Terms](#_10.0_GLOSSARY_OF)

[References](#_REFERENCES)

[Update Log](#_UPDATE_LOG)

[Appendix 1](#_Appendix_1:_Outbreak)

# 1. DISEASE REPORTING

# Purpose of Reporting and Surveillance

To monitor the burden of COVID-19 in Oregon, inform efforts to reduce transmission to others, promote health equity and better understand the epidemiology of this emerging disease.

# Laboratory and Physician Reporting Requirements

Healthcare providers and laboratories, including entities who have a CLIA waiver, are required to report test results indicative of and specific for COVID-19 to the local public health authority ([LPHA](http://?)) within 24 hours. Non-CLIA waiver testing entities are required to report negative results of COVID-19 testing within one local public health working day. As of January 28, 2022, under Oregon law, CLIA-waived facilities are not required to report negative COVID-19 antigen test results.

Healthcare providers are additionally required to report within 1 working day:

* + - All hospitalizations, defined in §10, among persons with COVID-19, whether or not the case was previously reported
    - All deaths, defined in §10, among persons with COVID-19, whether or not the case was previously reported
    - All cases of Multiorgan Inflammatory Syndrome in Children (MIS-C) (§3.7)

Reporting may be done through an “Online Morbidity Report,” which can be found at [www.healthoregon.org/howtoreport](http://?).

# Local Public Health Authority Responsibilities

1. Educate and consult with local providers and facilities to promote compliance with outbreak reporting, isolation, and infection-control procedures.
2. Investigate cases and outbreaks of COVID-19 associated with high-consequence settings (see §7.2.1).
3. Report all confirmed and presumptive cases not already transmitted electronically (e.g., cases identified through outbreak investigation or other passive means) by entering them into Opera with disease “Coronavirus” and subtype “COVID-19.”
4. Consult with the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) as needed about patient isolation and protection of contacts, including healthcare personnel, and about strategies for public health response, testing, and access to therapeutics.
5. Make available education for confirmed and presumptive cases on best practices to prevent disease spread, including self-isolating to limit additional close contacts, informing their close contacts about monitoring for symptoms, testing and seeking care when appropriate.
6. If auto-processing by OHA not already adopted, process electronic laboratory reports (ELRs) of positive and indeterminate COVID-19 test results.
7. If auto-processing by OHA not already adopted, process electronic case reports (eCRs) in Opera. Manually update test results, hospitalization status, and death status.

# State Public Health Division Responsibilities

1. Update LPHAs on changes to criteria for investigation (e.g., through HAN, multijurisdictional conference calls, etc.).
2. Relay to LPHAs information on presumptive and confirmed cases received from Oregon Department of Corrections, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other jurisdictions.
3. Assist LPHAs in processing eCRs and REDcap surveys in Opera, including creating cases, adding hospitalization status, and recording deaths.
4. Support investigation and response to high-risk cases and high-consequence outbreaks.
5. Assist LPHAs in processing ELRs of COVID-19 test results.
6. Develop and maintain information systems for case and contact surveillance.
7. Manage notifications from the CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ).
8. Advise LPHA, Tribal, and private-sector health professionals concerning:
   * Isolation of cases and symptomatic persons;
   * Protection of healthcare personnel;
   * Diagnostic evaluation;
   * Required reporting and surveillance activities.
9. Coordinate multi-jurisdictional outbreak responses.
10. Arrange consultation with infectious disease specialists and CDC as needed.
11. Report confirmed and presumptive COVID-19 cases and deaths to CDC.
12. Update REDCap survey, importing, and matching process as needed.

# THE DISEASE AND ITS EPIDEMIOLOGY

# Etiologic Agent

Coronaviruses are enveloped, single-stranded RNA viruses. With the notable exceptions of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, most human coronaviruses typically cause mild upper respiratory illness. SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus causing COVID-19 was first identified in Wuhan, China in December 2019 among patients with severe respiratory illness and pneumonia and has spread around the globe through person-to-person transmission. Genomic sequencing of isolates demonstrates that the COVID-19 virus is a betacoronavirus with roughly 80% genome identity with SARS-CoV and 50% with MERS-CoV. Variants with demonstrated or suspected characteristics of public health importance such as increased transmissibility, severity, vaccine resistance or diagnostic or therapeutic escape have been labeled ‘variants of concern’ or ‘variants of interest’, respectively.

# Description of Illness

Symptoms are non-specific and may include fever (temperature of ≥100.4°F or 38.0°C) or chills, sore throat, cough, shortness of breath or dyspnea, myalgia, fatigue, loss of smell (anosmia) or taste (ageusia), headache, congestion or runny nose, nausea/vomiting and diarrhea. A significant proportion of cases are asymptomatic. Pneumonia typically presents with patchy, multilobar infiltrates on chest X-ray. Reported complications have included but are not limited to acute respiratory distress syndrome, cardiac events, and death.

COVID-19-associated multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C) is defined by fever, multisystem involvement (cardiac, renal, respiratory, hematologic, gastrointestinal, dermatologic or neurologic), laboratory evidence of inflammation and recent COVID-19 infection.

COVID-19 associated multisystem inflammatory syndrome in adults (MIS-A) is defined by fever, multisystem involvement which must include severe cardiac illness or rash and conjunctivitis, laboratory evidence of inflammation and recent COVID-19 infection.

# Reservoirs

Members of the coronavirus family are common in many different species of animals, including camels, cattle, cats, and bats. Rarely, animal coronaviruses can infect people and then spread from person to person, as occurred with MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV. The frequency with which the COVID-19 virus is transmitted from its original animal reservoir(s) to humans is unknown, but such events are probably rare. The prevalence of animal infection with SARS-CoV-2 is an area of active research.

# Sources and Routes of Transmission

This virus probably originated from an animal source and was followed by rapid person-to-person spread. Person-to-person transmission occurs primarily from respiratory droplets and aerosols produced when an infected person coughs, sneezes, breathes or speaks. It is possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes, but this is likely a minor route of transmission. Studies suggest that coronaviruses may persist on surfaces for up to several days. Virus is detectable in the urine and feces of infected persons, and replication-competent virus has been demonstrated. While no concrete evidence exists for the fecal-oral spread of SARS-CoV-2, one study has demonstrated probable evidence of fecal-aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Transmission from blood or other body fluids has not been identified.

# Incubation Period

Typically, 4–6 (range, 2–14) days.

# Period of Communicability

In announcing the change to a 5-day isolation period, CDC has cited evidence that “the majority of SARS-CoV-2 transmission occurs early in the course of illness, generally in the 1-2 days prior to onset of symptoms and the 2-3 days after.” Various studies pre-dating the emergence of the Omicron variant indicated an infectious period ranging from 3-9 days after symptom onset. Patients with more severe illness—i.e., hospitalized or severely immunocompromised (see §10 for definition)—have shed replication-competent virus for longer periods of time.

# Treatment, Prevention, and Limitation of Spread

*Note: FDA’s list of authorized treatments and preventives has changed continually. For the current list, see* [www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization#coviddrugs](http://?#coviddrugs).

***2.7.1 Vaccines against COVID-19***

Table X contains information on COVID-19 vaccines currently available as of October XX, 2022. COVID-19 vaccination recommendations continue to change, see the [CDC’s Overview of COVID-19 Vaccines](http://?) page for the most up-to-date recommendations ([https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/overview-COVID-19-vaccines.html](http://?)). Individuals are considered up to date with their COVID-19 vaccinations when they have received all recommended primary series and booster doses.

**Table X.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Vaccine** | **License status** | **Age group** | **Dose (µg)** | **Volume (mL)** | **Schedule/Dose interval** |
| **Primary Series, monovalent** | | | | | |
| Pfizer-BioNTech (BNT162b2, Comirnaty®); mRNA vaccine | FDA Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) | 6 mos-4 years | 3 | 0.2 | 3 doses:  2nd dose 3-8 weeks after first  3rd dose at least 8 weeks after 2nd dose |
| 5-11 years | 10 | 0.2 | 2 doses\* 3-8‽ weeks apart |
| FDA approved as Comirnaty | 12-17 years | 30 | 0.3 | 2 doses\* 3-8 weeks apart |
| 18+ years | 30 | 0.3 | 2 doses\* 3-8 weeks apart |
| Moderna (mRNA-1273, Spikevax®); mRNA vaccine | FDA EUA | 6 mos-5 years | 25 | 0.25 | 2 doses\* 4-8 weeks apart |
| 6-11 years | 50 | 0.5 | 2 doses\* 4-8 weeks apart |
| 12-17 years | 100 | 0.5 | 2 doses\* 4-8 weeks apart |
| FDA approved as Spikevax | 18+ years | 100 | 0.5 | 2 doses\* 4-8 weeks apart |
| Novavax (NVX-Cov2373); adjuvanted protein subunit vaccine | FDA EUA | 12-17 years | 5 spike protein; 50 adjuvant | 0.5 | 2 doses 3-8 weeks apart |
| 18+ years | 5 | 0.5 | 2 doses 4-8 weeks after first |
| Janssen (Ad.26.COV2.S); viral vector vaccine | FDA EUA – not a preferred vaccine† | 18+ years | 5x1010 viral particles | 0.5 | 1 dose\*\*,◊ |
| **Boosters, monovalent and bivalent** | | | | | |
| Monovalent Pfizer-BioNTech (BNT162b2, Comirnaty®); mRNA vaccine | FDA EUA | 5-11 years | 10 | 0.2 | Monovalent booster at least 5 months after 2nd dose for children 5-11 years who previously received a primary series of Pfizer-BioNTech |
| Bivalent Pfizer-BioNTech; mRNA vaccine | FDA EUA | 12+ years | 30 | 0.3 | 2 months after previous dose (last primary dose or monovalent booster) |
| Bivalent Moderna; mRNA vaccine | FDA EUA | 18+ years | 50 | 0.5 | 2 months after previous dose (last primary dose or monovalent booster) |
| **Notes**  \* 3-dose primary series recommended for certain individuals who are moderately to severely immunocompromised  ‽ An 8-week interval may be optimal for some people ages 12 years and older, especially for males ages 12 to 39 years. A shorter interval (3 weeks for Pfizer-BioNTech; 4 weeks for Moderna) between the first and second doses remains the recommended interval for: people who are moderately or severely immunocompromised; adults ages 65 years and older; and others who need rapid protection due to increased concern about community transmission or risk of severe disease.  \*\* A dose of mRNA vaccine is recommended at ≥28 days after the primary series dose for moderately or severely immunocompromised persons  ◊ A single Janssen booster dose may be given to patients ≥18 years of age for whom other FDA-authorized or approved COVID-19 vaccines are not accessible or clinically appropriate, and to persons ≥18 years of age who elect to receive the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine because they would otherwise not receive a COVID-19 vaccine  †EUA for persons aged ≥18 years for whom other FDA-authorized or approved vaccines are not accessible or clinically appropriate, and individuals 18 years of age and older who elect to receive the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine because they would otherwise not receive a COVID-19 vaccine. | | | | | |

*Note: Individuals who were vaccinated outside the United States and have completed the primary series (1 or 2 doses) of a vaccine accepted in the United States - AstraZeneca, BIBP/Sinopharm, Sinovac, Bharat Biotech (COVAXIN),Novovax/Covovax, or CanSino – and are not yet eligible for a booster are considered up to date. Visit the CDC’s* [*Stay up to Date with COVID-19 Vaccines*](http://?) *webpage for more information.*

Each of the vaccines is contraindicated in patients who have had a severe allergic reaction (e.g., anaphylaxis) to a previous dose of that vaccine or to any of its components. In most situations, Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, or Novavax vaccines are recommended over the Janssen vaccine for primary and booster doses due to the risk of serious adverse events. Refer to the [Oregon COVID-19 Vaccine Model Standing Orders](http://?) ([https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PREVENTIONWELLNESS/VACCINESIMMUNIZATION/IMMUNIZATIONPROVIDERRESOURCES/COVIDDocuments/SOCOVID-19.pdf](http://?)) for additional clinical information related to vaccine contraindications and considerations for administration of the Janssen vaccine.



***2.7.2 Pre-exposure prophylaxis***

1. Tixagevimab co-packaged with cilgavimab (Evusheld®): administered as two separate, consecutive intramuscular injections (one injection per monoclonal antibody, given in immediate succession), for **pre**-exposure prophylaxis of COVID-19 in certain persons ≥12 years of age and weighing at least 40 kilograms (about 88 pounds). The product is authorized only for individuals who
   1. are not currently infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus **and**
   2. have not recently been exposed to an individual infected with SARS-CoV-2 **and**
   3. have either
      1. moderately to severely compromised immune systems due to a medical condition or due to taking immunosuppressive medications or treatments and who therefore may not mount an adequate immune response to COVID-19 vaccination (see the [fact sheet](http://?) for health care providers); **or**
      2. a history of severe adverse reactions to a COVID-19 vaccine or a component of those vaccines, such that vaccination with an available COVID-19 vaccine is not recommended.

***2.7.3 Treatment*** *[[1]](#footnote-5)*

***Please refer to the [National Institutes of Health COVID-19 Treatment Guidelines](https://www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.gov/) for the most current information regarding COVID-19 therapeutics.***

* + - 1. Remdesivir (Veklury®):
         1. FDA-approved for the treatment of COVID-19 in persons ≥12 years of age and weighing at least 40 kilograms (about 88 pounds) who are

**hospitalized, or**

not hospitalized and have mild-to-moderate COVID-19, and are at high risk for progression to severe COVID-19, including hospitalization or death.

* + - * 1. Authorized for treatment of suspected or laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 in pediatric patients weighing 3.5 kg to <40 kg; or pediatric patients <12 years of age weighing ≥3.5 kg **who are**

**hospitalized, or**

**not hospitalized but are at high risk for progression to severe COVID-19, including hospitalization or death**.

* + - 1. Baricitinib (Olumiant®):
         1. FDA-approved for the treatment of COVID-19 in hospitalized adults requiring supplemental oxygen, non-invasive or invasive mechanical ventilation, or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO)
         2. Authorized for the treatment of COVID-19 in **hospitalized** patients ≥2 years of age requiring supplemental oxygen, non-invasive or invasive mechanical ventilation, or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO).

1. Tocilizumab (Actemra®): Authorized for the treatment of COVID-19 in **hospitalized** persons ≥2 years of age who are receiving systemic corticosteroids and require supplemental oxygen, non-invasive or invasive mechanical ventilation, or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). Tocilizumab is an interleukin-6 receptor inhibitor, and its effectiveness should not differ for SARS-CoV-2 variants.
2. Nirmatrelvir/ritonavir (Paxlovid®, copackaged for oral use); authorized for the treatment of mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in patients ≥12 years of age and weighing ≥40 kilograms (about 88 pounds), with positive results of direct SARS-CoV-2 testing, and who are at high risk for progression to severe COVID-19, including hospitalization or death. Paxlovid® is available by prescription only and should be initiated as soon as possible after diagnosis of COVID-19 and within five days of symptom onset.
3. Molnupiravir (Lagevrio®): authorized for the treatment of mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in patients ≥18 years of age with positive results of direct SARS-CoV-2 viral testing, and **who do not require hospitalization** due to COVID-19 but who are at high risk for progression to severe COVID-19 including hospitalization or death, and for whom alternative COVID-19 treatment options authorized by the FDA are not accessible or clinically appropriate. Molnupiravir is available by prescription only and should be initiated as soon as possible after diagnosis of COVID-19 and within five days of symptom onset. Molnupiravir is not authorized for use in patients younger than 18 years of age because molnupiravir may affect bone and cartilage growth.
4. Convalescent plasma with high titers of anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies: [authorized](http://?) for treatment of COVID-19 in both outpatients and inpatients with immunosuppressive disease or who are receiving immunosuppressive treatment.﷟

# 3.0 CASE AND CLINICAL DEFINITIONS

# 3.1 Close Contact

A close contact is a person with an epidemiologic exposure to a person with confirmed or presumptive COVID-19. The exposure may be close contact with a confirmed or presumptive case—being within 6 feet of a COVID-19 case for ≥15 minutes[[2]](#footnote-6)—or contact with their infectious secretions or clinical specimens.

Note:

* + - This definition only applies to persons who have close contact with a confirmed or presumptive case. Persons who have an epidemiologic exposure to a close contact do not meet this definition.

# 3.2 Suspect Case

A suspect case is a person with:

* + - New onset of symptoms consistent with COVID-19, including fever or chills, cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing, fatigue, muscle or body aches, headache, new loss of taste or smell, sore throat, congestion or runny nose, nausea or vomiting, or diarrhea

AND

* + - No more likely alternative diagnosis

Note: This includes people who had close contact with a presumptive[[3]](#footnote-7) case and have an acute illness featuring at least two of the following: shortness of breath, cough, fever, new loss of smell or taste, radiographic evidence of viral pneumonia.

OR

* + - A test result that, in combination with their symptoms, does not meet the definition of a confirmed or presumptive case, including:
      * An indeterminate reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), other nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT)[[4]](#footnote-8) or antigen result;
      * A close contact who is getting tested

These criteria are for epidemiologic classification and are not meant to direct clinician testing or clinical care.

Individuals who initially are classified as Suspect may ultimately be re-classified to Confirmed or Presumptive pending additional laboratory testing, new symptoms, or previously unknown epidemiologic linkage. LPHAs should update the case status for close contacts whose test results are pending once those results are reported to public health. See §4.5 for further guidance on managing individuals whose initial test results were obtained from an at-home test kit.

# 3.3 Confirmed Case

A confirmed case is someone who tests positive using a laboratory-based FDA Emergency Use Authorized (EUA) diagnostic test. Any positive result from a laboratory-based RT-PCR, other NAAT, or antigen platform developed under an FDA EUA, even if conducted as asymptomatic screening, is considered a positive result. A follow-up test which is negative does not negate the initial positive test.

If a laboratory report has not been received, but a confirmatory laboratory result has been reported verbally by a healthcare provider or by an electronic case report (eCR) that clearly identifies a confirmatory laboratory result, the case will be considered confirmed.

Note: If the eCR does not clearly identify a confirmatory laboratory result, consider the person a suspect case with a pending test.

If a person is diagnosed with MIS-C (see §3.6), create a confirmed Coronavirus case in addition to their MIS-C case. If their only diagnostic test was serology, consider them a confirmed case, but do not initiate contact tracing.

# 3.4 Presumptive Case

A presumptive case is a person without a positive **laboratory-based** COVID-19 RT-PCR, NAAT, or antigen test result,[[5]](#footnote-9) with:

* + - An acute illness featuring at least two of the following: shortness of breath, cough, fever,[[6]](#footnote-10) new loss of smell or taste, radiographic evidence of viral pneumonia;

AND

* + - No more likely alternative diagnosis; AND
    - Within the 14 days before illness onset:
      * Had close contact with a confirmed case

OR

* + - * Lived in the same household or congregate setting as a confirmed case

OR

* + - * Is identified as having been exposed in an outbreak

OR

* + - A COVID-19-specific ICD-10 code listed as a primary or contributing cause of death on a death certificate.

OR

* + - A person with a positive test result from an at-home test kit

OR

* + Self-identifies as having tested positive for COVID-19 and completes the REDCap case investigation survey

If a presumptive case tests positive for COVID-19 by a laboratory-based RT-PCR, NAAT, or antigen test, update the case’s status to confirmed. If a presumptive case tests negative for COVID-19 by an RT-PCR, NAAT, or antigen test, the case remains presumptive.

Note: Isolation should not be based on case definitions. If an individual develops any symptoms associated with COVID-19 after a known exposure (even if those symptoms are mild and do not meet the presumptive case definition), that individual should be instructed to isolate for at least 5 days (unless they qualify for a longer isolation period per the guidelines in §5).

# 3.6 Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Children (MIS-C)

* + - An individual aged <21 years presenting with fever, [[7]](#footnote-11) laboratory evidence of inflammation,[[8]](#footnote-12) and evidence of clinically severe illness requiring hospitalization, with involvement of at least 2 of the following organ systems: cardiac, renal, respiratory, hematologic, gastrointestinal, dermatologic, or neurological;

AND

* + - No alternative more likely diagnosis; AND
    - Evidence for current or recent SARS-CoV-2 infection by RT-PCR, NAAT, serology, or antigen testing; or COVID-19 exposure within the 28 days prior to the onset of symptoms.

Some individuals may fulfill full or partial criteria for Kawasaki disease but should be reported if they meet the case definition for MIS-C. Consider MIS-C in any pediatric death with evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection.

# 3.7 Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Adults (MIS-A)

# An individual ≥21 years with fever, laboratory evidence of inflammation (at least two of the following must be elevated: CRP, ferritin, IL-6, ESR, procalcitonin), and evidence of clinically severe illness requiring hospitalization with at least 3 of the following clinical criteria, one of which must be a primary clinical criterion

# Primary clinical criteria

# Severe cardiac illness (e.g., myocarditis, pericarditis, coronary artery dilatation, new ventricular dysfunction, 2nd/3rd degree AV block, or ventricular tachycardia)

# Rash or non-purulent conjunctivitis

# Secondary clinical criteria

# New-onset neurologic signs and symptoms (e.g., encephalopathy, seizures, meningeal signs, peripheral neuropathy)

# Shock or hypotension not attributable to medical therapy

# Abdominal pain, vomiting or diarrhea

# Thrombocytopenia

# AND

# No alternative more likely diagnosis; AND

* Evidence for current or recent SARS-CoV-2 infection by RT-PCR, NAAT, serology, or antigen testing; or COVID-19 exposure within the 28 days prior to the onset of symptoms.

# MIS-A reporting is through OCRP and no case investigation is required. Clinical chart review will occur at OHA. Please contact Melissa Sutton with questions or concerns.

# OHSU’s Dr. Holly Villamagna is offering a series of webinars for clinical providers statewide and offering telephone consults for providers with suspected cases. You can read more about MIS-A here: [https://www.cdc.gov/mis/mis-a/hcp.html](http://?).

# 4.0 LABORATORY TESTING

# 4.1 Testing at Commercial Laboratories

Guidance has been established to provide criteria for testing at a commercial laboratories versus OSPHL. Current guidance can be found at [OHA COVID-19 Healthcare Partner Resources](http://?).

# 4.2 Testing at the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory

Testing through the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory (OSPHL) must be approved by the COVID-19 Testing Team or the COVID-19 Regional Epidemiologist supporting the outbreak**.** The [Criteria for COVID-19 Testing at OSPHL](http://?) provides general information about testing policies and targeted populations tested at OSPHL. Current guidance for specimen collection, handling, and transport is posted on OSPHL’s [Lab Test Menu](http://?).

Whole genome sequencing for SARS-CoV-2 is available at OSPHL. Please review the [Criteria for Requesting COVID-19 Sequencing at OSPHL](http://?) for details on how to make a request, the approvals process, and required specimen types.

Specimens should be collected as soon as possible after a presumptive or suspect case is identified, regardless of symptom onset date.

Please share the following information with the facility or laboratory that is packing and shipping the specimens for testing at OSPHL:

* Heed the specimen storage and transport temperatures required for the specimen being collected. All requirements are posted at [www.healthoregon.org/labtests](http://?).
* Ensure the cap of the specimen container is properly threaded and sealed.
* Label each specimen container with two unique patient identifiers (e.g., full name, date of birth, medical record number), unique specimen ID (e.g., laboratory requisition number), specimen type (e.g., NP, OP) and the date the sample was collected. The unique patient identifiers on the specimen must match those on the corresponding Test Request Form.
* Submit one COVID-19 and Flu Test Request Form per specimen (available at [www.bitly.com/phl-forms](http://?)).
* Place the Test Request Form in the outer pocket of the specimen transport bag. Do not put the form in the sealed portion of the bag with the specimen.
* Transport specimens and required forms to OSPHL as soon as possible.

Whenever possible, existing courier systems (e.g., hospital system couriers) or shipping options (e.g., FedEx) should be used for specimen transport. If other transport systems are not available, contact OSPHL (503-693-4100) for help with specimen transport on the next available courier route.

# 4.3 Collecting Specimens

Specimens should be collected while using proper personal protective equipment (PPE). See CDC’s [healthcare infection control guidance](http://?).

For specimen collection that involves an aerosol-generating procedure (§10): Using an airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) is ideal, but if one is not available, use a private room and keep the door closed. Mask the patient with a surgical facemask during any movement within clinic or facility. See [OHA guidance on infection prevention and control for COVID-19](http://?).

Many common respiratory infections present with symptoms similar to those of COVID-19. If a person tests positive for a common respiratory pathogen, testing for COVID-19 remains indicated, as co-infections may occur.

# 4.4 Guidance Regarding Serologic Tests

Serologic test results do not currently alter case classifications and serology should not be used for diagnosis of COVID-19 infection.

Except where specifically identified, all references in this guide to a “test” or “testing” refer to RT-PCR, NAAT, or antigen tests and not to serology.

# 4.5 Guidance Regarding At-Home Test Kits and Point-of-Care Tests

# At-home COVID-19 test kits are widely available. Patients with positive test results should be encouraged to follow-up with a medical provider if they have questions or require medical evaluation.

# 

# 5.0 QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION

# 5.1 Quarantine for the General Population

# *Note: The general population includes students and staff associated with K-12 and childcare settings and most other individuals and settings. Details on individuals and settings excluded from the general population can be found on CDC’s webpage and throughout this document.*

# Most people exposed to COVID-19 (i.e., close contacts) do not need to quarantine (i.e., stay away from other people during the time they are most likely to become infected). However, close contacts should be aware of their potential to become infected and infect others around them.

* + - * **All close** **contacts**, regardless of vaccination status or prior infection with COVID-19 are recommended to:
      * Watch for COVID-19 like symptoms for 10 days after their last exposure.
      * If symptoms develop, stay home and test .
      * Wear a well-fitting mask around other people for the 10 days following their last exposure.
      * Avoid unnecessary visits with high-risk individuals (e.g., residents of congregate care facilities, persons with immunocompromising conditions, etc.).
      * Consider testing five days after their exposure if no symptoms have developed.
      * Follow guidance for isolation (§5.2) if they test positive or develop COVID-19 symptoms[[9]](#footnote-13).

# 5.2 Isolation

***5.2.1 Recommendations for the general population:***

* + All confirmed and presumptive cases, including asymptomatic cases, should isolate until they meet criteria for discontinuation of isolation (§5.2.3). Cases should stay home and away from other people at least 5 days since their symptom onset, and until 24 hours after fever is gone without use of antipyretics, and other COVID-19 symptoms are improving.
  + Cases should also wear a mask when they are around other people in the 10 days after they become sick or test positive.
    - Individuals who cannot or do not mask during days 6–10 of their isolation period should stay home for 10 days.
  + Cases should avoid people who are at increased risk for severe disease as well as nursing homes and other high-risk congregate settings for 10 days.
  + If the case is asymptomatic or discrete onset of symptoms cannot be determined, they should stay home for five days following the specimen collection date of their positive test.
  + If an asymptomatic case develops symptoms compatible with COVID-19 (e.g., fever, cough, diarrhea, new loss of taste or smell, or shortness of breath) before the end of their initial isolation period, the five-day isolation and 10-day masking period should be restarted on the date of symptom onset.
  + If a case has a recurrence or worsening of symptoms after their isolation has ended, isolation should restart at day 0.
  + When possible, COVID-19 cases should take care to not handle pets or other animals while sick. Refer to CDC’s guidance on what to do [If You Are Sick or Caring for Someone](http://?) for comprehensive guidance.

***5.2.2 Isolation recommendations for individuals with severe illness or who are*** *i****mmunocompromised***

For cases with severe illness—including cases hospitalized for their COVID-19 illness—or who are severely immunocompromised (see §10), the period of isolation is at least 10 days and up to 20 days. Individuals who were severely ill or who are immunocompromised should consult with their healthcare provider to determine when they should resume being around other people.

As described in the [CDC Decision Memo](http://?), an estimated 95% of severely or critically ill patients, including some who are severely immunocompromised (see §10), no longer had replication-competent virus 15 days after onset of symptoms; no patients had replication-competent virus more than 20 days after onset of symptoms. Based on this research, it is recommended to use symptom-based release from isolation rather than the test-based strategy.

**Table 2.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Symptom Severity and Immune Status** | **Isolation Recommendations** | **Additional Notes** |
| No or mild symptoms  AND  Not immunocompromised | Isolate for at least 5 days after first positive test or symptom onset; should be fever free for at least 24 hours and other symptoms improving  Wear a mask around others for 10 days after first positive test or symptom onset | Individuals unable to wear a mask should isolate for 10 days  If initially asymptomatic and symptoms develop, restart isolation  If symptoms recur or worsen, restart isolation  High risk congregate setting residents should isolate for 10 days regardless of symptom severity |
| Moderate (shortness of breath, difficulty breathing) or severe symptoms (hospitalized)  AND  Not immunocompromised | Isolate for at least 10 days after positive test or symptom onset | Severely ill patients may have a longer infectious period requiring isolation of up to 20 days. Serial testing prior to ending isolation in consultation with infectious disease experts |
| Moderate or severely immunocompromised  AND  Any level of symptom severity | Isolate at least 20 days after positive test or symptom onset | Use serial testing to determine isolation end date; patient should have 2 consecutive negative tests at least 24 hours apart with resolution of fever and improvement of other symptoms.  Retest for SARS-CoV-2 if symptoms return or worsen |

***5.2.3 Discontinuation of Isolation***

**Symptom-based discontinuation of isolation:**

Someone who was symptomatic can considered the discontinuation of isolation when it has been at least five days from their symptom onset, and they have been afebrile without use of antipyretics and have had improving cough, shortness of breath, or diarrhea for 24 hours. If the person was never symptomatic, they are released from isolation five days after the first specimen that tested positive was collected. If an asymptomatic case develops symptoms compatible with COVID-19 (e.g., fever, cough, diarrhea, new loss of taste or smell, or shortness of breath) before the end of their initial isolation period, the five-day isolation period should be re-started on the date of symptom onset. For those with severe illness—including those who were hospitalized for their COVID-19 illness—or who are severely immunocompromised, the recommended period of isolation is 20 days.

**Test-based discontinuation of isolation:**

In general, the [test-based strategy](http://?) is not recommended for discontinuing isolation. CDC does provide two scenarios in which a test-based strategy could be considered:

* In rare instances, for early discontinuation of transmission-based precautions in healthcare settings. *This should be used with caution as individuals may have prolonged shedding without clear link to sustained transmission risk, which limits the utility of this approach. Could be considered in scenarios where the risk of isolation may outweigh the benefits.*
* To inform discontinuation of isolation if concerns are present that the individual may be infectious for more than 20 days (e.g., if severe symptoms or severely immunocompromised). *Recommended that it be conducted in consultation with local infectious disease experts.*

CDC [criteria](http://?) for test-based strategy:

* Resolution of fever without the use of fever-reducing medications **and**
* Symptoms (e.g., cough, shortness of breath) have improved, **and**
* Results are negative from at least two consecutive respiratory specimens collected ≥24 hours apart (total of two negative specimens) tested using an antigen test or NAAT.

***5.2.4*** ***Becoming a case after 90 days have passed since onset of the original case***

If a previously confirmed or presumptive case meets the confirmed or presumptive case definition more than 90 days after symptom onset or first positive test for their original case, create a new, separate case for them in Opera.

# 5.3 Isolation and Quarantine for Groups and Settings Not Included in the General Population

Please see the sections below for specialized quarantine guidance in the following populations:

* + - * Healthcare workers (§8.1) ([OHA guidance](http://?) / [CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Inpatient healthcare settings (e.g., hospitals, inpatient hospice) (§8.1) ([OHA guidance](http://?) / [CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Long-term care facilities (LTCFs) (§8.1) ([OHA guidance](http://?) / [CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Adult family/foster homes (AFHs) (§8.1) ([OHA guidance](http://?) / [CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Residential healthcare settings (e.g., child and adult behavioral health residential treatment facilities, intellectual or developmental disabilities 24 hour residential programs) (§8.1) ([OHA guidance](http://?) / [CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Carceral facilities (e.g., prisons, jails, youth detention facilities) (§8.3) ([CDC guidance](http://?))
      * Employer-provided congregate housing (also called labor housing per OR-OSHA) (§8.2)
      * Shelters, supportive/supported living, temporary/transitional housing (§8.2)
      * Travelers (§8.5) ([CDC Guidance](http://?#do-not-travel))

# 6.0 LPHA Case Management

# 6.1 Suspect Cases

Suspect cases are persons as defined in §3.2. Broadly, these are persons who do not meet the presumptive case definition either because they do not have a positive test for COVID-19; it might be pending or indeterminate. Serology might be the only documented test; except in the case of MIS-C or MIS-A, a positive serologic result is not case-defining (see §3.6 and §3.7).

*OSPHL Testing of Suspect Cases*

OSPHL testing is prioritized for high-priority individuals, defined in §10, and in support of outbreak investigations. Testing is generally reserved for symptomatic persons, but testing may be approved for asymptomatic persons in support of outbreak investigations. See [Guidance for providers regarding COVID-19 testing](http://?) for details. It is expected that healthcare facilities and other employers take responsibility for any testing needed for their staff.

# 6.2 Confirmed and Presumptive Cases

***6.2.1 Interviewing***

Universal case interviews are no longer required. LPHAs should prioritize interviewing cases at highest risk for severe disease and transmitting disease in high-consequence facilities. Identification of these cases is expected to be done passively, primarily as outbreaks in high-consequence settings are reported to the LPHA. Once a high-priority case has been identified, interviews may be completed by phone or REDCap survey, and COVID-19 case support team staff may be able to assist with individual interviews as resources allow.

***6.2.2 Contact investigations***

Universal contact tracing is no longer recommended. Elicitation of close contacts is recommended during investigation of high-consequence outbreaks. As resources allow, obtain the name, address, and telephone number of all persons who have had close contact to the confirmed or presumptive COVID-19 case from 48 hours prior to a case’s symptom onset, or for asymptomatic cases prior to the collection of the first specimen that tested positive, to the time the case was placed in isolation. This information may be used to help direct facility infection control practices and health education.

# 7.0 OUTBREAK RESPONSE

**7.1 Outbreak Response**

As with other respiratory disease outbreaks, an outbreak of COVID-19 can be defined generally as ≥2 confirmed or presumptive cases who are in the same institutional cohort. In the absence of active case investigation and contact tracing, however, most of these outbreaks will remain unknown by public health. *LPHAs are not required to conduct active outbreak identification but are expected to respond to those in high-consequence settings that are brought to their attention, according to the below thresholds (§7.2.1)*.

Some institutions and facilities report COVID-19 cases to public health using established thresholds:

* Certain congregate care providers[[10]](#footnote-14) must report all confirmed cases of COVID-19 to their licensor and public health
* K-12 schools and Early Learning Division (ELD) childcare providers are asked to report respiratory illnesses associated with unusually high levels of absenteeism (on any given day) to public health using the following thresholds:
  + At the school/facility level (e.g., K-12 school or center-based childcare program): ≥ 30% absenteeism, with at least 10 students/children or staff absent
  + At the cohort level (e.g., classroom or home-based childcare program): ≥ 20% absenteeism, with at least 3 students/children or staff absent

If an LPHA is notified of a school or childcare with elevated absenteeism but no identified illness profile (e.g., respiratory illness, gastrointestinal illness), an outbreak does not need to be opened until further information is gathered. Schools and childcares do not need to report elevated absenteeism to LPHAs when there is a non-disease related reason (i.e., day before or after a holiday or long weekend, students are participating in an out of school activity, etc.).

**7.2 Creating Opera Outbreak Records**

LPHAs should create an Opera outbreak record **when they are notified** (passive identification) of the following:

***7.2.1 High-consequence settings***

* 1 or more confirmed/presumptive cases of COVID-19 among staff or residents in a **congregate residential care setting**:
  + Long Term Care Facilities (LTCFs):
    - Nursing Facilities (NF)
    - Assisted Living Facilities (ALF), including memory care (MC) facilities
    - Residential Care Facilities (RCF), including MC facilities
  + Adult Foster Homes (AFH)
  + Child and Adult Behavioral Health Facilities (BH)
  + Intellectual and Development Disability and Child Welfare Residential Settings (i.e., group homes)
* 2 or more confirmed/presumptive cases of COVID-19 in **other high-risk or high-consequence settings**, including:
  + Shelters
  + Jails/Prisons
  + Employer-provided congregate housing
  + Agriculture settings (e.g., farms and dairies)
  + Food packing and processing facilities
  + Other settings of concern as determined by the LPHA

***7.2.2 K-12 schools and childcare***

* 1 or more confirmed/presumptive cases[[11]](#footnote-15) of COVID-19 among staff or students **in K-12 schools or childcare settings** with absenteeism that meets or exceeds the reporting thresholds described above

**7.3 Outbreak Response Activities and Database Management**

The following information is intended to describe the actions and documentation that is prioritized for COVID-19 outbreak response and situational awareness in high-consequence settings, as defined above. When LPHA capacity is limited, COVID-19 Regional Epidemiologists are available to support this work. Please ensure you are communicating with the OHA lead epidemiologist assigned to each COVID-19 outbreak to ensure appropriate collaboration.

***7.3.1 For all High-Consequence Settings***

* Encourage prompt testing for other people within the setting who have been exposed to a case(s) of COVID-19.
* Work with facilities, OHA and other partners to ensure prompt treatment is made available to those who are eligible.
* Encourage vaccination to anyone not vaccinated and boosted, where appropriate.
* Conduct weekly check in with facility to ensure continued awareness of new cases or fatalities until 28 days after last case is detected.
* Ensure all known confirmed and presumptive cases reported by the facility to the LPHA are in Opera and linked to the outbreak record.
* Summarize guidance or other resources provided to the facility.
* Document testing capacity and testing plans; include dates, testing laboratory and other resources to be used (e.g., specimen collection teams, on-site testing equipment/platform, etc.).
* Update Opera with any fatalities or hospitalizations that occur among cases.
* Document any staffing challenges or requests for crisis staffing support.
* Document any resources offered/provided (e.g., PPE, vaccination, therapeutics, etc.).
* Document any Interagency Support Team (IAST) calls held.

***7.3.2 Congregate Residential Care Settings***

* Upload line list of confirmed and presumptive cases among staff and residents; may use online case log if facility is able to complete it.
* Collect vaccination uptake rates for residents and staff.
  + For LTCFs, if the facility is not already tracking COVID-19 vaccination status for all residents and staff, send the OHA-developed vaccine tracking tools to the facility, which will assist the facility to monitor both individual- and facility-level vaccine status information. The Resident Tracking Tool can be found [he](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/covid19/Documents/COVID-19-Vaccine-Tracking-Sheet-Residents.xlsx)[re](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/covid19/Documents/COVID-19-Vaccine-Tracking-Sheet-Residents.xlsx), and the Staff Tracking Tool [h](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/covid19/Documents/COVID-19-Vaccine-Tracking-Sheet-Staff.xlsx)[ere](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/covid19/Documents/COVID-19-Vaccine-Tracking-Sheet-Staff.xlsx).
* Provide the facility with [the COVID-19 case log for LTCFs](https://www.oregon.gov/oha/covid19/Documents/COVID19-Case-Log.xlsx) and appropriate [infection control recommendations](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html).
* Offer and document infection control consultation with OHA HAI regional infection preventionist. Infection control assistance can be requested via the [OHA Infection Control Consultation Request Form](http://?).

***7.3.3 Carceral Setting Outbreaks***

* Document vaccination status of staff and adults in custody (AICs)/youth if available.
* Offer and document infection control consultation with COVID-19 Population Support Epidemiologists.
* Document if there are significant staffing challenges or other concerns (e.g., need for facility decompression).

***7.3.4 Other High-Consequence Outbreak Settings***

* Document any consultations or collaboration with other state agencies (e.g., ODA, OR-OSHA, etc.)
* Document any collaboration with community-based organizations or other partners working to support the people affected by the outbreak.

***7.3.5 K-12 School/ELD childcare Outbreaks***

* At the time of the initial report from the school or childcare facility, request a list of the first 10 individuals out with respiratory illness (ideally: name, date of birth, classroom or cohort name). *Case-level information is not required after the first 10 individuals are identified and an etiology is confirmed (if needed).*
* Follow-up with school weekly to ascertain if continued absenteeism has led to staffing shortages, transition to remote learning, or temporary school or cohort closures; document findings in the outbreak record.
* Given the potential for long-term transmission of multiple respiratory pathogens in school and childcare settings, consider closing outbreaks when the facility or cohort absenteeism has remained below the reporting threshold (see §7.1) for the recommended outbreak monitoring period (assume 28 days for COVID-19).

See §8 for how to manage outbreaks in special situations.

# 8.0. MANAGING SPECIAL SITUATIONS

# 8.1 Healthcare Settings

**This section applies to healthcare settings and healthcare workers and staff as defined in** [OAR 333-019-1010](http://?)**.** These settings include:

* + - * Long-term care facilities (LTCFs), including nursing, assisted living, and residential care facilities
      * Adult foster homes (AFHs) providing healthcare services (e.g., behavioral health and those licensed by ODHS Aging and People with Disabilities (APD))
      * Residential healthcare settings (e.g., child and adult behavioral health residential treatment facilities, intellectual or developmental disabilities 24-hour residential programs)
      * Inpatient healthcare settings (e.g., hospitals, inpatient hospice)

**The following Oregon Administrative Rules remain in effect:**

* + - * [OAR 333-019-1011](http://?) **– Masking requirement to control COVID-19 in healthcare settings**
      * [OAR 333-019-1010](http://?) **– COVID-19 vaccination requirement for healthcare providers and healthcare staff in healthcare settings**
      * [OAR 411-061](http://?) **– COVID-19 vaccination reporting requirements for licensed assisted living, nursing, and residential care facilities**
      * [OAR 411-060](http://?) **(under revision) – COVID-19 testing in licensed assisted living, nursing and residential care facilities**

**For additional healthcare specific guidance, please see:**

* [Infection Control: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) | CDC](http://?)
* [Interim Guidance for Managing Healthcare Personnel with SARS-CoV-2 Infection or Exposure to SARS-CoV-2 | CDC](http://?)
* [Strategies to Mitigate Healthcare Personnel Staffing Shortages | CDC](http://?)

Note that the following documents will be retired in deference to CDC guidance:

* + - * [OHA Interim Guidance for Managing Healthcare Personnel with SARS-CoV-2 Infection or Exposure](http://?)
      * [Clinical Care and Healthcare Infection Prevention and Control for COVID-19.](http://?)

***8.1.1. Quarantine for healthcare workers, patients, and residents in healthcare settings***

**In general, transmission-based precautions (quarantine) are not recommended for asymptomatic healthcare facility inpatients and residents following an exposure** to someone with suspected or confirmed COVID-19, regardless of vaccination status. Additionally, asymptomatic healthcare personnel no longer require work restrictions (quarantine) following close contact with someone suspected or confirmed COVID-19, regardless of vaccination status.

Healthcare personnel who have a higher-risk exposure should take additional steps to reduce the risk of spreading COVID-19. Generally, a higher-risk exposure is considered prolonged close contact with a patient, visitor, other healthcare worker, or other members of the community outside of the workplace (e.g., household contacts) with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 and the healthcare personnel was not:

* Wearing a respirator (or if wearing a mask, the person with SARS-CoV-2 was not wearing a mask);
* Wearing eye protection if the person with SARS-CoV-2 was not wearing a mask; or
* Wearing all recommended PPE while in the room for an aerosol-generating procedure

Following any close contact with someone with SARS-CoV-2 for asymptomatic patients and residents or following a higher risk exposure for asymptomatic healthcare personnel, the individual should:

* Complete a series of 3 viral tests for SARS-CoV-2, typically at day 1 (where day of exposure is day 0), day 3 and day 5. That is at least 24 hours after the initial exposure, and if negative 48 hours later and again another 48 hours later if the second test is also negative;
* Wear well-fitting source control;
* Monitor themselves for fever or other symptoms of COVID-19; and
* Stay home when ill or if they test positive for SARS-CoV-2.

*Note: Smaller congregate care facilities (i.e., adult foster homes) may not have routine and consistent access to the testing and specimen collection resources needed to conduct serial testing as recommended above. Though it is recommended that facilities that house high-risk or medically fragile residents test according to the testing schedule above, AFHs could otherwise follow testing strategies as outlined in* [*community prevention strategies based on COVID-19 Community Level*](http://?)*s.*

Quarantine for patients and residents or healthcare workers should be considered when the individual:

* Is unable to test or wear source control (i.e., respirators or well-fitting masks);
* Is moderately to severely immunocompromised;
* Resides on or provides care on a unit with patients who are moderately or severely immunocompromised; or
* Resides on or provides care on a unit experiencing ongoing SARS-CoV-2 transmission that is not controlled with initial interventions.

Healthcare workers who are put under work restrictions (i.e., quarantine) can return to work and transmission-based precautions can be lifted for patients:

* After day 7 following the exposure if they remain asymptomatic and all viral testing conducted is negative; or
* After 10 days if testing is not performed and they remain asymptomatic.

Testing recommendations for patients or residents with exposure or during outbreak scenarios can be found in CDC [Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations](http://?).

Residents of congregate healthcare settings that work outside of that setting are allowed to return to work after exposure to a confirmed or presumptive COVID-19 case, presuming that they remain asymptomatic and have not tested positive for COVID-19.

Outpatients that have been exposed to COVID-19 should be cared for using appropriate [Transmission-Based Precautions](http://?). Considerations for outpatient visits can be found in [Clinical Questions about COVID-19: Questions and Answers | CDC](http://?#Infection-Control).

***8.1.2 Isolation for healthcare workers, patients, and residents in healthcare settings***

Healthcare workers should be restricted from work following the criteria outlined below. After returning to work, the healthcare worker should continue to monitor for symptoms and seek re-evaluation if symptoms recur or worsen.

**Table X. Healthcare worker restrictions**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Illness Severity\* and Immune Status** | **Work Restriction Recommendations** | **Additional Notes** |
| No symptoms or mild or moderate illness  AND  Not immunocompromised | At least 7 days after symptoms began or first positive test if asymptomatic with a negative viral test within 48 hours of returning to work AND  At least 24 hours fever free AND  Other symptoms improving | 10 days if no viral testing completed or test positive on day 5-7  If using antigen test, obtain a test on day 5 and day 7 |
| Severe illness  AND  Not immunocompromised | At least 10 days and up to 20 days since symptoms began AND  At least 24 hours fever free AND  Other symptoms improving | Can consider using a test-based strategy in consultation with infectious disease expert to determine when the staff can return to work |
| Moderate or severely immunocompromised  AND  Any level of symptom severity | Test-based strategy in consultation with infectious disease expert to determine when the staff can return to work | 2 consecutive negative tests at least 24 hours apart  If symptomatic, should be fever free for at least 24 hours and other symptoms improving to end isolation  Retest for SARS-CoV-2 if symptoms return or worsen |
| \* As defined by the CDC: [https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/guidance-risk-assesment-hcp.html](http://?) | | |

Patients and residents of healthcare settings should isolate for at least 10 days. If the individual is asymptomatic or has mild or moderate illness and is not immunocompromised, isolation can end after 10 full days have passed since the first positive test or symptom onset if they have been fever free for at least 24 hours and other symptoms are improving. For patients with severe to critical COVID-19 illness, isolation is at least 10 days but up to 20 days since symptom onset with the individual being fever free for at least 24 hours and other symptoms improving. As is outlined in the table above for healthcare workers, testing can be used to help inform the duration of isolation. Patients with COVID-19 and who are moderately to severely immunocompromised should consult with an infectious disease specialist to implement the testing strategy outlined for healthcare works in the table above.

***8.1.2 Contact tracing in healthcare settings***

Healthcare facilities, including LTCFs, should conduct a risk assessment of HCW exposures and apply work restriction according to level of risk as outlined in CDC’s [Interim Guidance for Managing Personnel with SARS-CoV-2 Infection or Exposure](http://?).

Formal contact tracing for exposures in healthcare settings may be infeasible and of limited benefit when community transmission of COVID-19 is [high](http://?) and staffing is insufficient to maintain this work. In these scenarios, healthcare facilities should consider forgoing contact tracing for exposures in a healthcare setting in favor of broad infection control measures (e.g., well-fitting masks, ventilation, frequent symptom monitoring, and readily accessible testing) Additional infection prevention and control recommendations, including more details about universal source control in healthcare settings, are [**available**](http://?) from the CDC.

In cases of healthcare worker exposures of staff or patients in healthcare systems in which a designated individual or team, qualified by education, training, and experience or certification, is responsible for carrying out facility infection prevention protocols and is available to serve as primary point of contact for the facility regarding COVID-19 outbreaks, a risk assessment may be performed that takes into account presence of symptoms, proximity and duration of encounters, and the use of personal protective equipment. The healthcare facility or system will take the lead on contact tracing and patient exposure notifications and will consult their local public health authority as needed. Healthcare facilities or systems have some discretion in identifying exposures that are higher risk and warrant notification and quarantine. Risk stratification should be aligned with [CDC guidance](http://?).

Features of higher-risk exposures:

* Longer duration of exposure
* Healthcare provider close contact with patient airway (e.g., intubation, pharyngeal examination, bronchoscopy, laryngoscopy)
* Patient unmasked

Features of lower-risk exposures:

* Shorter duration of exposure
* No close contact with airway or mucous membrane
* Patient masked

In addition to any determination made due to the above factors, healthcare systems must notify contacts of healthcare providers with COVID-19 if *either* of the following are true:

1) an infection control breach is identified (i.e., the healthcare provider with COVID-19 did not wear appropriate source control during the encounter), **or**

2) the hospitalized patient resides or will be transferred to a congregate care setting.

***8.1.3 Caring for hospitalized COVID-19 cases***

HCW who enter the room of a patient with suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection should adhere to standard precautions and use a fit-tested N95 or higher-level respirator (or a facemask if respirator supply is genuinely limited and measures to obtain N95-level or higher respiratory protection via local or state resource requests have been exhausted), gown, gloves, and eye protection. Performing or assisting with an aerosol-generating procedure warrants airborne precautions, including an N95 or higher-level respiratory protection. Any necessary aerosol-generating procedures (§10) should be undertaken in an airborne infection isolation room, if available. Additional PPE considerations are provided in CDC [Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations](http://?) .Transmission-based precautions should continue to be followed until [discontinuation of isolation criteria](http://?) are met.

***8.1.4 Responding to a case or outbreak in LTCFs (SNF, ALF, RCF, MC)***

COVID-19 can present with a broad range of symptoms (see §3.2), making identification of outbreaks difficult. LPHAs should have a low threshold for investigation when there is a cluster of illnesses in a congregate residential setting. Because COVID-like illness (CLI) and influenza-like illness (ILI) are similar, it is a priority to investigate any CLI or ILI in LTCFs and other congregate settings because they may indicate an outbreak of either; see §8.2 and §8.3 for guidance specific to outbreaks in other congregate settings and correctional facilities, respectively. Respiratory specimens should be collected from all ill persons in such outbreaks to be tested for COVID-19; and, during influenza season, for influenza. Testing for other pathogens may be considered.

Please remember that while influenza itself is not reportable, ILI *outbreaks* are reportable. If an ILI outbreak is identified, call the regular ACDP line (971-673-1111) to report the outbreak.

Following the identification of a single new case of COVID-19 in a resident or healthcare worker, LTCFs should determine if others in the facility are ill or have been exposed. LTCFs have the option to conduct contact tracing if resources and experience allow. However, a broad-based approach (e.g., unit, floor, full facility) is preferred if resources and experience in conducting contact tracing are not available within the LTCF, all potential contacts cannot be identified, or if contact tracing fails to halt transmission. OHA is in the processing of developing guides to aid LTCFs in contact tracing.

Broad-based testing or testing of all close contacts (if contact tracing implemented) is recommended regardless of vaccination status, as identified by the LTCF. Viral testing is recommended at days 1, 3, and 5, with the exposure occurring on day 0, Quarantine is recommended as outlined in §8.1.1, however all individuals being tested for a potential exposure should wear source control. If no additional cases are identified during contact tracing or broad-based testing, no further testing is indicated.

In the event of ongoing transmission that is not controlled with initial interventions, a facility should strongly consider implementing quarantine for residents and healthcare workers with higher-risk exposures. If additional cases are identified, facilities should strongly consider moving to broad-based testing and implementing quarantine for residents in affected areas of the facility.

# *8.1.5 Testing guidance in LTCFs*

Oregon Department of Human Services (OHDS) is in the process of amending [Oregon Administrative Rules, Chapter 411, Division 60](http://?) regarding COVID-19 testing in licensed assisted living facilities, nursing facilities, and residential care facilities, in light of recent CDC Guidance updates.

If additional cases are identified during the initial round of testing, a facility should strongly consider shifting to the broad-based testing approach, if not already in use, and implement quarantine for residents in affected areas of the facility. As part of the broad-based approach, testing should continue on affected unit(s) or facility-wide every 3-7 days until there are no new cases for 14 days. If antigen tests are being used, consider more frequent testing (every 3 days).

As needed, coordinate with facility and the COVID-19 Regional Epidemiologist to schedule outbreak-associated testing of staff and residents at the OSPHL. If assistance with specimen collection is needed, COVID-19 Regional Epidemiologists can coordinate new specimen collection in collaboration with COVID-19 Testing Team staff. Coordination of this task is not expected to occur outside of regular business hours.

# 8.2 Non-Healthcare Congregate Settings (e.g., shelters, supported/supportive living, temporary/transitional housing, employer-provided congregate housing)

***8.2.1 Quarantine recommendations for non-healthcare congregate settings***

Following an exposure to COVID-19, residents (regardless of vaccination status) and staff (who are not up to date on COVID-19 vaccination) of non-healthcare congregate facilities are recommended, to the extent possible, to complete a 10-day quarantine within or from the facility, respectively.

Residents of non-healthcare congregate living settings who attend school or work outside of that setting are allowed to return to work or school after exposure to a confirmed or presumptive COVID-19 case, presuming that they remain asymptomatic.

***8.2.2 Isolation recommendations for non-healthcare congregate settings***

Due to the high risk of secondary transmission and difficulties in cohorting individuals, a 10-day isolation period is recommended for residents and staff of congregate facilities. During periods of critical staffing shortages, facilities may consider shortening the isolation period for staff to ensure continuity of operations. Decisions to shorten isolation in these settings should be made in consultation with the LPHA or OHA.

Residents of congregate living settings may return to work or school after completion of their 5-day isolation period provided they have been fever-free for at least 24 hours, their symptoms are improving, and they are able to mask while around other people for the remaining 5 days of their isolation period. They should, however, continue to isolate from other residents in the congregate living setting for the full 10-day isolation period.

***8.2.3 Responding to outbreaks in non-healthcare congregate settings***

Similar to healthcare settings, non-healthcare congregate settings with COVID-19 cases benefit from early intervention. This includes providing guidance for testing, infection control practices (e.g., cohorting, ventilation, PPE use), and access to vaccines and medical care.

Although not required, non-healthcare congregate settings should strive to test all staff and residents if a case of COVID-19 is identified among staff or residents in the facility. Testing should occur at least twice, one week apart, and ideally should continue weekly until at least two rounds of testing result in no new positive cases. LPHAs are encouraged to offer infection control consultations in collaboration with the OHA HAI team. If the LPHA experiences challenges with facilities, they should work with their COVID-19 Regional Epidemiologist to elevate concerns and connect with the appropriate licensing and regulatory body.

# 8.3 Carceral Settings (prisons, jails, youth detention facilities)

***8.3.1 Quarantine recommendations for carceral settings***

To the extent possible, residents and staff of carceral facilities are recommended to complete a 10-day quarantine. The quarantining of individuals in custody should not interfere with their ability to receive essential services, including mental health counseling. In consultation with the LPHA or OHA, facilities may consider a modified approach to quarantine. Options for modified quarantine include:

* + Quarantining only exposed residents and staff who are not up to date on their COVID-19 vaccines and who have not recovered from a prior SARS-CoV-2 infection in the last 90 days.
  + Shortening the time that residents and staff are required to quarantine by incorporating a testing element – ending quarantine after at least 5 days with a negative test or testing daily for at least 5 days and allow individuals to participate in normal activities as long as test results are negative
  + Allowing a quarantine cohort to move outside the quarantine space and continue daily activities as a group, but without mixing with residents or staff not assigned to their cohort. If considering this option, the facility should be able to maintain consistent staff assignments and use of well-fitting masks among staff and residents.

If a modified quarantine approach is implemented, all residents and staff potentially exposed should continue to monitor for symptoms for a full 10 days after their last exposure. Additional information on modified quarantine options is available from the CDC ([https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html](http://?)).

***8.3.2 Isolation recommendations for carceral settings***

Due to the high risk of secondary transmission and difficulties in cohorting individuals, a 10-day isolation period is recommended for residents and staff of carceral facilities. During periods of critical staffing shortages, facilities may consider shortening the isolation period for staff to ensure continuity of operations. Decisions to shorten isolation in these settings should be made in consultation with the LPHA or OHA. See §5.2.1.

***8.3.3 Managing cases associated with the Oregon Department of Corrections***

When there is a case of COVID-19 in an Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) facility, ODOC will perform a contact investigation within the facility, including a preliminary case interview to identify basic information about the case and contact tracing. Upon release, LPHAs can use this information to support their efforts (§While the case is incarcerated, set the institution of residence to the ODOC facility).

When ODOC knows that a case or contact will be released soon, they will contact OHA with the pertinent information. ODOC will also contact Community Corrections with contact information and the person’s status. LPHAs are encouraged to establish relationships with their local Community Corrections office.

If a case is identified in a local correctional facility not under ODOC jurisdiction, the LPHA should work with Community Corrections to investigate the case.

**Counting and reporting of cases in ODOC**

Cases are counted in the county in which they are diagnosed. ODOC might move adults in custody between ODOC facilities for case management purposes, but these cases do not transfer jurisdictions for reporting purposes.

**Managing and investigating cases and contacts**

OHA will create confirmed and presumptive cases based on ODOC information that is reported through the Oregon COVID-19 Reporting Portal (OCRP).

For LPHAs who have not opted into auto-processing of ELRs, cases among adults in custody that are reported via ELR should be processed by the LPHA where the corrections facility is located. While the case is incarcerated, the LPHA should set the institution of residence to the corrections facility by clicking the “Set” button in the ‘Address’ pop-up window in Opera and selecting the corrections facility from the list.

LPHAs are encouraged to coordinate with Community Corrections ahead of the release of a case or contact from the ODOC facility to establish a plan to connect with the case or contact upon release.

8.4

# 8.6 Pregnant Persons

Pregnant persons are at increased risk for severe COVID-19. Pregnant persons who develop COVID-19 are also at increased risk of pregnancy complications. Vertical transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been associated with cesarean delivery, but not with breast feeding.[[12]](#footnote-16) Pregnant persons should be vaccinated and take additional precautions to avoid infections, including masking, frequent hand washing and avoiding people who are sick. Testing is recommended for all neonates born to women with confirmed or presumptive COVID-19, regardless of whether there are signs of infection in the neonate.

# 9.0 DATA MANAGEMENT

# 9.1 Data Access and Processing

Because of the likelihood that contacts and cases will move or have connections across counties, all counties will have “All View/All Edit” access to cases of Person Under Monitoring and Coronavirus in Opera.

Unless someone meets the criteria for a truly separate case (see §5.2), they should only have one Coronavirus case created for them. For example, if someone was a suspect case and then tests positive by PCR, do not create a separate confirmed case. Update the status of the existing case to the most accurate status.

# 9.2 REDCap Platform

The REDCap platform will be maintained by OHA. Completed REDCap surveys will be reviewed for data quality and imported into Opera Monday through Friday (note: data from REDCap surveys will be pushed to matching cases in Opera Tue–Sat).

* + If a matching Confirmed or Presumptive case is found, the REDCap survey will be linked to the case and data will be imported from the survey into Opera.
  + Presumptive cases will be created from REDCap surveys that include a report of a positive at-home test if no matching Confirmed or Presumptive case is found.

Data from the REDCap survey are mapped to matching variables in Opera. Survey data from REDCap will not override any existing data in Opera.

# 9.3 Cases Identified in Another Jurisdiction

As cases are identified through investigations in other jurisdictions—for example, if an Oregon resident has tested positive in a neighboring state—OHA will create a case record for those individuals based on the information provided by the reporting jurisdiction.

# 9.5 MIS-C and MIS-A Case Management in Opera

All MIS-C and MIS-A cases entered in Opera should be classified as suspect; ACDP staff will change the classification to confirmed, as appropriate, once chart review is complete. Cases should be routed to Nasreen Abdullah for investigation.

# 9.6 Outbreak Data Management

Use the epi-link type for all cases to indicate the type of exposure. When linking cases to an outbreak, include the outbreak number for all first- and second-generation cases associated with the outbreak. These terms describe a case’s proximity to the place of exposure. First-generation cases are those that have the shared exposure; for example, these are workers at a worksite outbreak, or children and staff at a daycare that has an outbreak, even if those cases have onsets spread over time. Second-generation cases do not share the original exposure but have close contact to a first-generation case. Cases beyond the second generation should not have the outbreak number added to their case. See section 7.3 for a description of the information LPHAs should prioritize for documentation.

If the confirmed or presumptive case is identified in a resident or staff member of a congregate setting, the LPHA should create an outbreak in the Opera Outbreaks database to facilitate tracking and linking to other residents or staff who become symptomatic or get tested. Often, identification of a single case has led to the recognition of other cases and prompt institution of control measures. If no additional cases are identified within 14 days of the single case, the outbreak should be closed.

When an LPHA is made aware of a respiratory disease outbreak with an unknown etiology, open the outbreak in Opera Outbreaks. If testing identifies a pathogen other than COVID-19 or multiple pathogens among the ill individuals, OHA Regional Epidemiologists will assist in getting the appropriate documentation into Orpheus Outbreaks.

# 9.7 OHA Reporting to CDC

OHA will electronically report all known COVID-19 cases and deaths to CDC through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). CDC’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be notified at 770-488-7100 only if assistance or guidance is needed.

# 10.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Aerosol-generating procedures**: Include, but are not limited to:

* Intubation, extubation, and related procedures such as manual ventilation and open suctioning
* Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
* Tracheotomy and tracheostomy procedures (insertion, open suctioning, removal)
* Bronchoscopy
* Surgery and post-mortem procedures involving high-speed devices
* Some dental procedures (such as high-speed drilling)
* Non-invasive ventilation (NIV) such as bi-level positive airway pressure (BiPAP) and continuous positive airway pressure ventilation (CPAP)
* High-frequency oscillating ventilation (HFOV)
* High-flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) [i.e., oxygen delivered through high-flow nasal cannula (HFNC) at ≥15L/min].
* Induction of sputum
* Medication administration via continuous nebulizer

**COVID-19-related death**: A death is considered to be related to COVID-19 in any of the following circumstances:

* Death of a confirmed or probable COVID-19 case within 60 days of the earliest available date among exposure to a confirmed case, onset of symptoms, or date of specimen collection for the first positive test;
* Death from any cause in a hospitalized person during their hospital stay or in the 60 days following discharge **and** a COVID-19-positive laboratory diagnostic test at any time since 14 days prior to hospitalization; or
* Death of someone with a COVID-19-specific ICD-10 code listed as a primary or contributing cause of death on a death certificate, regardless of the dates of diagnosis or death.

**COVID-19-related hospitalization**: If the patient is admitted to an acute care facility following an ER or outpatient visit, then the patient has been hospitalized. A case would not be considered hospitalized if admitted for a <24-hour observation period only. A case would be considered hospitalized if admitted for ≥24 hours in an observation unit or ER. A COVID-19- related hospitalization is defined as:

* Any confirmed case hospitalized within 14 days of any positive test or who tests positive during their hospitalization; or
* Any presumptive case hospitalized within 14 days of their illness onset.

**Health care worker (HCW):** Any paid or unpaid person serving in a healthcare setting who has the potential for direct or indirect exposure to patients or infectious materials, including body substances (e.g., blood, tissue, and specific body fluids); contaminated medical supplies, devices, and equipment; or contaminated environmental surfaces. HCWs may include, but are not limited to, emergency medical service personnel, nurses, nursing assistants, physicians, technicians, therapists, personal support workers, home care workers, phlebotomists, pharmacists, students and trainees, veterinarians, dentists, contractual staff not employed by the health care facility, and persons (e.g., clerical, dietary, environmental services, laundry, security, maintenance, engineering and facilities management, administrative, billing, and volunteer personnel) not directly involved in patient care but potentially exposed to infectious agents that can be transmitted between HCWs and patients.

**Moderate or severely immunocompromised person:** Those who require care in a protected environment, (e.g., bone marrow transplant recipients, individuals with severe combined immunodeficiency”) and HIV+ persons with CD4+ percentages <15% or CD4+T lymphocyte counts <200. Immunocompromised persons include but are not limited to those who:

* Been receiving active cancer treatment for tumors or cancers of the blood
* Received an organ transplant and are taking medicine to suppress the immune system
* Received chimeric antigen receptor (CAR)-T-cell therapy (a treatment to help your immune system attach to and kill cancer cells) or received a stem cell transplant (within the last 2 years)
* Moderate or severe primary immunodeficiency (such as DiGeorge syndrome, Wiskott-Aldrich syndrome)
* Advanced or untreated HIV infection
* Active treatment with high-dose corticosteroids or other drugs that may suppress the immune response

**Period of transmissibility:** This is the time when cases can transmit disease to others. For symptomatic cases, this begins 48 hours prior to symptom onset. For asymptomatic cases, this begins 48 hours prior to the collection of the first specimen that tested positive. The period of transmissibility extends until the case has met criteria for discontinuation of isolation.

**Physical distancing:** Maintaining distance from others to the greatest extent possible. Physical distancing measures reduce opportunities for person-to-person virus transmission and can help slow the spread of the disease, as well as save lives.

# REFERENCES

1. OHA main page for COVID-19: [https://govstatus.egov.com/OR-OHA-COVID-19](http://?)
2. CDC main page for COVID-19: [www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html](http://?)
3. COVID-19 Resource Centre at *The Lancet*: [www.thelancet.com/coronavirus](http://?)
4. 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) at the *New England Journal of Medicine*: [www.nejm.org/coronavirus](http://?)
5. ODE and OHA, Planning for COVID-19 Scenarios in Schools: [www.oregon.gov/ode/students-and- family/healthsafety/Documents/Planning%20and%20Responding%20to%20COVID- 19%20Scenarios%20in%20Schools%20August%202020.pdf](http://?)
6. ODE and OHA, Ready Schools, Safe Learners: [www.oregon.gov/ode/students-and- family/healthsafety/documents/ready%20schools%20safe%20learners%202020- 21%20guidance.pdf](http://?)

# UPDATE LOG

October XX, 2022.

May 27, 2022. Revised outbreak response section; updated treatment and vaccines section; removed historic K-12, ELD, and agriculture outbreak subsections; added new CDC guidance for outbreaks in carceral settings (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Paul Cieslak).

March 12, 2022. Removed requirement for quarantine among the general population; updated K-12 and childcare guidance sections; formatting changes in the healthcare and other congregate settings sections; updated vaccines section. (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Becca Pierce, Melissa Sutton, Paul Cieslak).

February 4, 2022. Added childcare isolation and quarantine guidance; updated recommendations for isolation and quarantine in healthcare settings; provided numerous clarifications throughout. (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Becca Pierce).

January 14, 2022. Updated K-12 exposure guidance; added mitigation strategies for K-12 settings; eliminated negative test reporting for certain testing entities; clarified isolation/quarantine guidance for other congregate settings and carceral settings (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Melissa Sutton, Tom Jeanne, Becca Pierce).

January 7, 2022. Changes to formatting throughout document; adopted new guidelines for case investigation and contact tracing; updated isolation and quarantine guidelines to match those released on January 4, 2022 by CDC; updated TTS protocol to align with new isolation and quarantine guidance (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Tom Jeanne, Becca Pierce, Lex Zhang).

December 29, 2021. Adopted new CDC shortened quarantine and isolation guidance for the general population and HCW; updated vaccine and treatment section; removed guidance regarding active monitoring; removed 7-day shortened quarantine with test; removed outbreak guidance regarding general workplaces; added language and intention for prioritizing public health response for COVID-19. (Amanda Faulkner, Paul Cieslak, Becca Pierce, Tom Jeanne).

December 6, 2021. Defined extracurricular activities in the test to stay guidance; clarified that masked staff on school buses are also eligible for test to stay. (Amanda Faulkner, Melissa Sutton).

December 2, 2021. Added language regarding the risk of outdoor exposures and variables to consider when determining if quarantine is needed for contacts; added language for a modified quarantine option for exposures in K-12 settings where universal masking is in place, updated test interpretation table (Lee Peters, Tom Jeanne, Paul Cieslak, Melissa Sutton, Amanda Faulkner)

November 18, 2021. Updated presumptive case definition to specify symptoms for persons who test positive using an at-home test; removed recommendation for people who test positive at-home to follow-up with a confirmatory test; recommended use of 7-day quarantine with negative test option for close contacts who work in or attend K-12 schools (Amanda Faulkner, Lee Peters, Tom Jeanne, Melissa Sutton).

October 19, 2021. Added language about close contact exceptions for outdoor K–12 settings; revised ideal post-exposure test window to 5–7 days (Meagan McLafferty, Amanda Faulkner).

September 24, 2021. Added language about new case investigation protocol; clarified school outbreak management; modified presumptive case definition symptom requirements for people who test positive with an at-home test; lab updates (Sarah Humphrey, Shane Seavey, Becca Pierce, Lee Peters, Amanda Faulkner).

August 6, 2021. Added new CDC close contact exemption in school settings; added school-specific outbreak response section; updated testing recommendations for close contacts regardless of vaccination status; added information on MIS-A surveillance (Amanda Faulkner, Becca Pierce, Lee Peters, Paul Cieslak).

July 6, 2021. Changed response time for case interviews to one local public health working day; removed requirement for outbreak record to be opened for all schools with more than 1 case; defined testing strategy parameters for discontinuation of isolation. (Amanda Faulkner, Becca Pierce).

June 3, 2021. Updated quarantine guidelines to allow local public health to adopt shortened quarantine periods of 10 or 7 days with a negative test among the general population with exceptions in certain high-risk settings. (Amanda Faulkner)

April 29, 2021. Updated duration of quarantine to 14 days for all unvaccinated close contacts; updated surge conditions guidance section. Added detail to vaccination/treatment section. (Amanda Faulkner).

March 22, 2021. Added clarification surrounding vaccine breakthrough case surveillance follow-up; clarified use of test-based discontinuation of isolation; provided language regarding upcoming OSPHL whole genome sequencing capacity; clarified at-home test kits. (Amanda Faulkner).

February 17, 2021. Added Surge Conditions Guidance section; refined new quarantine guidance for fully-immunized close contacts in health care settings to match CDC’s; updated infection control language to align with [OHA Clinical and Infection Control Guidance, added breakthrough case surveillance project information.](http://?) (Amanda Faulkner, Rebecca Pierce).

January 20, 2021. Updated treatment, prevention and limitation of spread section; provided new quarantine guidance for fully-immunized close contacts; clarified timing of isolation period for asymptomatic cases who subsequently develop symptoms. (Amanda Faulkner).

December 9, 2020. Removed language regarding creation of suspect cases based on negative test results; added options for shorter quarantine, adopting CDC options in part (Amanda Faulkner, Melissa Sutton, Paul Cieslak).

November 25, 2020. Added clarification for assessment and notification regarding persons exposed to cases among healthcare workers, removed test-based discontinuation of isolation, modified close contact definition to include ’24-hour’ time frame in line with CDC, included direction for sharing case information with schools, directed LPHA to classify MIS-C cases as Suspect until chart review is complete. (Kristen Hollywood, Melissa Sutton, Amanda Faulkner).

September 18, 2020. Clarified the recommended isolation period for cases who live in congregate settings, updated language to reflect that all jurisdictions are on ARIAS, defined first- and second-generation in the context of linking cases to outbreaks, added required data elements for outbreak reporting, added the definition of COVID-19- related hospitalization, sundry edits (Steve Rekant).

July 23, 2020. Changed all mentions of Orpheus to Opera, updated discontinuation of isolation criteria for symptoms from 72 hours to 24 hours, deemphasized test-based discontinuation of isolation and added the longer minimum period for specific groups, included new testing rules and guidance, added positive antigen tests to the confirmed case definition and added language about any test developed under an FDA EUA, added description of criteria for possible work exemptions for quarantine and isolation, sundry edits (Steve Rekant)

July 2, 2020. Clarified language around using test-based discontinuation of isolation in LTCFs, added requirement for LPHAs to share information with employers (Steve Rekant)

June 24, 2020. Added details about investigating outbreaks, added references to ARIAS, clarified definition of suspect and presumptive cases including information about antigen testing, added MIS-C, disentangled discontinuation of isolation and assessment of recovery, harmonized language across sections, sundry edits (Steve Rekant)

May 1, 2020. Added presumptive case definition and revised recommended follow-up with contacts, defined recovery and clarified release from isolation, defined COVID-19- related deaths, clarified language around testing, added required follow-up for close contacts. (Steve Rekant, Kelly Cogswell)

April 1, 2020. Added language for emergency rule regarding reporting deaths and hospitalizations; reduced expectations for follow-up of potentially exposed persons; clarified language regarding testing in clusters; removed negative influenza test as a requirement for automatic testing approval at OSPHL; modified exposure period per new CDC guidance; added revised flowcharts. (Steve Rekant, Madeline LeVasseur, Amanda Faulkner, Rebecca Pierce)

March 23, 2020. Changed requirements for LPHA follow-up and investigation of PUMs, suspect cases, and confirmed cases. Updated guidance on monitoring and restrictions of exposed persons. Updated criteria for testing at OSPHL and overall testing prioritization recommendations. Changed language from PUI to suspect case and changed suspect and confirmed case definitions (Madeline LeVasseur, Steve Rekant, Amanda Faulkner, Orion McCotter)

March 12, 2020. Added information about other laboratories. Sundry edits. (Steve Rekant)

March 8, 2020. Edited testing criteria, PUM, PUI definitions. Updated guidance for discontinuation of isolation. Sundry edits. (Kelly Cogswell, Alexia Zhang)

March 3, 2020. Clarified contact tracing requirements. Added case classification table. Added definition of a presumptive case. Sundry edits. (Tasha Poissant, Madeline LeVasseur)

February 28, 2020. Updated PUI case definition and testing criteria. Updated testing availability at the OSPHL. Added current list of geographic areas with widespread or sustained community transmission. (Tasha Poissant, Madeline LeVasseur)

February 20, 2020. Provided guidance on discontinuation of isolation for PUIs or COVID- 19 cases and pregnant persons, and revised figures. (Alexia Zhang, Madeline LeVasseur, Steve Rekant)

February 12, 2020. Clarified expectations of LPHAs regarding contacting PUMs, provided guidance on interpreting testing, and revised figures. (Amanda Faulkner, Steve Rekant, Alexia Zhang)

February 7, 2020. Provided minor clarifications to date of PUM guidance implementation, DGMQ PUM forms, and Figures. (Amanda Faulkner, Steve Rekant)

February 6, 2020. Modification of PUM criteria, monitoring, and self-quarantine guidance.

Updated §2.5 *Incubation Period*. Minor edits for clarity. (Amanda Faulkner, Steve Rekant, Alexia Zhang)

January 2020. First draft. (Nicole West, Amanda Faulkner, Steve Rekant)

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1. *Bamlanivimab/etesevimab, Casirivimab/imdevimab, and Sotrovimab are no longer authorized for use as they are not effective against the Omicron variant* [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
2. This time is cumulative over a 24-hour period and does not have to be consecutive. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
3. If a contact of a presumptive case has symptoms consistent with COVID-19 but neither the contact nor the case has tested positive, the contact remains a suspect case. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
4. e.g., a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
5. Even with a negative test, a person with an identified epi-link, compatible symptoms, and no more likely diagnosis is still considered a presumptive case. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
6. Fever can be objective (≥100.4°F) or subjective. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
7. Fever can be objective (≥100.4°F) or subjective and must persist 24 hours. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
8. Including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: an elevated C-reactive protein (CRP), erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR), fibrinogen, procalcitonin, D-dimer, ferritin, lactic acid dehydrogenase (LDH), or interleukin 6 (IL-6), elevated neutrophils, reduced lymphocytes and low albumin. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
9. If a close contact develops any symptoms associated with COVID-19, regardless of vaccination status, even if they do not meet the presumptive case definition, they should isolate for 5 days following the onset of their symptom(s). However, if they do not ultimately meet the confirmed or presumptive case definitions, they may not be excluded from quarantine if they are exposed again in the 90 days following their current illness, unless they are up to date with their COVID-19 vaccines. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
10. Under ORS 433.004 healthcare providers must report all cases of COVID-19 to public health, which includes healthcare providers who diagnose or provide care to residents of congregate care facilities. The Oregon Department of Human Services Aging and People with Disabilities requires LTCFs to report all cases of COVID-19 among staff and residents in their facilities to the licensing team within the Safety, Oversight and Quality Unit and public health. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
11. If there are no confirmed or presumptive cases of COVID-19 among students or staff, LPHAs should open a respiratory disease outbreak in OPERA Outbreaks and pursue laboratory testing to identify the etiology. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
12. Villar J. JAMA Pediatr 2021; doi 10.1001/jamapediatrics.2021.1050 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)